Deutsch                     Russisch                      Chinesisch                     Französisch  

Political Statement: The Geopolitical Strategy of the United States in Light of the Theses of George Friedman

Introduction
The global political developments of the past hundred years cannot be viewed independently of the strategic interests of the United States. One of the most prominent analysts of these interests is the American geopolitical expert George Friedman. His reflections, particularly on the role of Germany and Russia in the global power structure, reveal a deep understanding of the continuity of American foreign policy. This document analyzes Friedman’s key assertions, places them in historical context, and explains their relevance to the current world situation.

1. The Central Thesis: Germany and Russia United as a Threat to U.S. Supremacy
According to George Friedman, the most important geopolitical interest of the U.S. for over a century has been to prevent close cooperation between Germany and Russia. These two nations, Friedman argues, would together possess all the prerequisites to form a Eurasian superpower that could seriously challenge the global dominance of the United States: Germany with its advanced industry and technology, Russia with its vast natural resources, strategic depth, and access to both continents.

2. Historical Implementation of This Strategy
Friedman believes that U.S. involvement in wars during the 20th century was motivated by this strategic goal:

• World War I: The U.S. entered the war in 1917 to prevent a hegemonic German Empire from dominating Europe.

• World War II: The United States fought against Nazi Germany, which sought continental dominance.

• Cold War: The postwar order was designed to keep Germany divided and Russia isolated, preventing any form of rapprochement between them.

3. The Role of NATO: Control Through Integration
NATO was founded not only as a defense alliance against the Soviet Union but also as an instrument to control Germany. The often-cited formula “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down” summarizes this well. Friedman emphasizes that Germany’s military integration into Western structures was not just about protection but also about geopolitical discipline.

4. Ukraine as a Geopolitical Buffer
Friedman views Ukraine as a key zone in the U.S. strategy to block any direct connection between Germany and Russia. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, U.S. foreign policy aimed to establish a “cordon sanitaire” between Western Europe and Russia. Ukraine, Moldova, Poland, the Baltic States, and Romania are meant to serve as geopolitical buffers to hinder Eurasian integration.

5. Friedman’s Original Quote
In his 2015 speech at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Friedman stated:

“The primordial interest of the United States, over which for centuries we have fought wars – the First, the Second and Cold War – has been the relationship between Germany and Russia. Because united, they are the only force that could threaten us. And we need to make sure that doesn’t happen.”

6. Relevance to the Present
This strategic continuity remains visible today: the targeted eastward expansion of NATO, sanctions against Russia, and the disruption of economic cooperation between Germany and Russia (e.g., Nord Stream 2) are all manifestations of this persistent U.S. doctrine. Germany is increasingly drawn into confrontations that do not directly serve its own interests but are instead part of a larger geopolitical game.

7. Conclusion
Friedman’s analysis provides deep insight into the long-term U.S. strategy. The German public and political leadership must become aware of these dynamics. Only through a sovereign, self-determined foreign policy can Germany and Europe represent their own interests. Reapproaching Russia as part of a Eurasian peace order should no longer be a taboo, but rather a subject of open political debate.

---

This statement may be used on politically informative websites, in civic initiatives, and for diplomatic outreach.